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SOVEREIGNTY AND CANADIAN-NIGERIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ENGAGEMENTS: 
SOME THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
ZACHARY A. LOMO 
Abstract 
This article attempts to draw some theoretical insights from the Canada-Nigeria human rights 
engagement from 1999 to 2011. Canada and Nigeria claim to seek cooperation on the principles 
of sovereign equality. What, then, is sovereignty and sovereign equality? The article will attempt 
to address the various approaches to theorizing sovereignty in four broad conceptual categories – 
sovereignty as State power and authority; sovereignty as the power and authority of the people; 
sovereignty as equality; and sovereignty as responsibility to protect. The nature of the Canada-
Nigeria engagements in human rights is scrutinized under two main themes – first, engagements 
in the political, economic spheres are examined; and second, engagements in the field of human 
rights. Theoretical insights that can be drawn from the Canada-Nigeria engagement in the field of 




I . THIS ARTICLE ATTEMPTS TO REFLECT ON SOVEREIGNTY in the light of the 
human rights engagements between Canada and Nigeria from 1999 to 2011. In so doing, it will 
first review the complex theory of sovereignty in its various strands. Second, it then discusses the 
nature of the human rights engagement between Canada and Nigeria. Third, it will draw some 
theoretical insights into the living character of sovereignty from the nature of these Canada and 
Nigeria human rights engagements. Fourth, it will draw some conclusions. 
II. THEORIZING SOVEREIGNTY:  
In their 2012 memorandum of understanding (MOU), Canada and Nigeria sought to “reinforce 
their cooperation based on the principles of sovereign equality, mutual benefit, and respect”1 as 
well as consultation in accordance with Charter of the United Nations (emphasis supplied). In 
what sense did the parties use the expression, “sovereign equality”? Is it the same thing as 
sovereignty? “Sovereign equality” is an adjectival expression consisting two separate terms, 
“sovereignty” and “equality,” which are key terms used to characterize the status of States in 
international law. It implies that for States to be equal, they have to be sovereign. What, then, is 
sovereignty? What are the indicia and elements of sovereignty and sovereign equality?  
Sovereignty and sovereign equality are concepts often associated with state entities by 
international lawyers (IL), political scientists and their subsets (such as international relations 
(IR) theorists, political philosophers), and historians. In its simplest meaning, the State may be 
defined as a community of people living in a particular geographical space and territory, 
recognized or otherwise. One of the key attributes of the State is said to be its possession of 
sovereignty. However, the meaning of sovereignty and how it has been conceptualized is 
contingent upon various world views or visions from which it is framed and historicized within 
particular locations and times. Sovereignty has been theorized through intellectual and theocratic 
or ecclesiastical perspectives or visions held at particular epochs.2 
 
                                                 
1 See High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of 
Canada”, (23 January 2013), Government of Canada, online: 
<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria/highlights-
faits/2013/BiNationalCommissionNationaleMixte.aspx?lang=en>. 
2 For a survey of the views of the leading thinkers and philosophers on sovereignty, see Winston Nagan & Aitza 
Haddad, “Sovereignty in Theory and Practice” (2012) 13 San Diego Int’l LJ 429. 
S   
  
  





From intellectual and ecclesiastical perspectives, sovereignty has been theorized as 
many things: as the power and authority of the State3, as the power and authority of the people4, 
as the responsibility to protect the common good5, as a social construct6; and as the responsibility 
to protect citizens of States and the entire globe.7 I will briefly discuss each and conclude with 
my own perspective on sovereignty. 
A. SOVEREIGNTY AS STATE POWER AND AUTHORITY 
Within the dominant western intellectual vision of sovereignty, and especially anglophone 
literature, sovereignty is theorized as State power and authority and historicized in relation to the 
emergency of the western European State. This historical accounting and theorizing, however, 
narrowly focuses on English and French historical antecedents and experiences.8 Thus, 
sovereignty is traced to the period of English and French jurists and political philosophers, such 
as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Bodin. Jean Bodin, the sixteen century French jurist 
and political philosopher, in particular, is touted as the first intellectual to frame the content of 
sovereignty, and did so in his seminal work, De Republica, published in 1576.9 The views of the 
peoples of the world, other than Europeans, about sovereignty, e.g., from Asia and Africa do not 
appear anywhere in these aspects of scholarship on sovereignty. 
Here, only a brief survey of the theoretical perspectives of Jean Bodin and the legal 
positivists of the nineteenth and twentieth century (John Austin and Oppenheim) are presented. 
For Jean Bodin, sovereignty was a source of strength and power which allowed the sovereign, 
the monarch, during Bodin’s time, to have control and authority over the feudal princes and thus 
construct a single stable European State.10 Sovereignty meant the power to make law and enforce 
the law. In Bodin’s conceptualization of sovereignty, the sovereign had the power to make law 
and was not bound by the laws he or she made. The sovereign, Bodin acknowledged, however, 
was bound by ‘the divine law, the law of nature or reason, the law that is common to all nations, 
and also certain laws which he calls the leges imperii, the laws of government’.11 
                                                 
3 See Robert Lansing, “Notes on Sovereignty in a State” (1907), 1:2 Am. J. Int'l L 105; Jean Bodin, “Bodin: On 
Sovereignty” in Julian H. Franklin, ed, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992).; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, (Menston: Scolar P., 1969).  
4 See Thomas Aquinas, Johannes, Summa Theologiecae, Volume II, Translated by Fathers of the English (Christian 
Classics, 1981); see also electronic version, Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica II translated by Fathers of 
the English Dominican Province (Benziger Brothers Edition, 1947), online: 
<http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Books/Texts/Aquinas/JustWar.html>; Wilfrid Parson, “St Thomas Aquinas and 
Popular Sovereignty” (1947), 16:3 Thought 473; Johannes Althusius, Politica Methodice Digesta of Johannes 
Althusius (Althaus), 3rd ed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932). 
5 See James Johnson, "Humanitarian Intervention, the Responsibility to Protect, and Sovereignty: Historical and 
Moral Reflections" (2015) 23:3 Int'l LR 609.; Luke Glanville, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A 
New History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014).  
6 See, e.g., Samuel Puferdorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, 4th ed (The Law Book Exchange Ltd., 2005).  
7 See ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa, IDRC, 2001); Francis Deng et al, Sovereignty as Responsibility: 
Conflict Management in Africa (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996); Geoffrey Butler, “Sovereignty 
and the League of Nations” (1920), 1 Brit YB Intl L 35. 
8 See Wyne Hudson, “Fables of Sovereignty” in Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford & Ramesh Thakur, eds, Re-
envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? (Padstow, Cornwall: International Ltd, 2008) 19.  
9 See Robert Jennings, “Sovereignty and International Law”, in Gerard Kreijen et al, eds, State, Sovereignty, and 
International Governance (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 27  
Atul Mishra, “Theorizing State Sovereignty in South Asia” (2008) 43:40 Economic and Political Weekly 65 at 66. 
10 Ibid. 
11 James Brierly, The Law of Nations (1959) cited in ibid. 
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Bodin’s power-centered theorizing of sovereignty was perfected by late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century legal positivist international lawyers who theorized international law as a 
scientific enterprise whereby the validity of law was sought in social facts and not in moral 
imperatives, and made a distinction between the law as is, separate and apart from the law as it 
ought to be.12 The sovereign, embodied in the State, was the law-giver, and was above the law as 
far as its internal domain was concerned. John Austin, considered one of the leading nineteenth 
century proponents of legal positivism, theorized sovereignty in relation to his theory of law, 
often referred to as the command theory of law (emphasis supplied).13 Law, according to Austin, 
“is a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power 
over him [or her].”14 In this context, the ‘intelligent being having power over him [or her],” is the 
sovereign. And as far as Austin was concerned, the sovereign was above the law and “any legal 
limit on the highest lawmaking power was an absurdity and an impossibility”:15 hence the idea 
that sovereignty means absolute or supreme authority of the State over all the affairs in its 
internal domain.  
Sovereignty as supreme power and authority became a dominant theme amongst 
positivist public international lawyers and jurists. Lassa Oppenheim, one of the pioneering 
theorists of positivist public international law, theorized sovereignty as “supreme authority,” 
which implies that it is “an authority which is independent of any other earthly authority.”16  A 
sovereign state’s independence “includes … independence all round within and without the 
borders of the country.”17 Lassa Oppenheim distinguished between two forms of sovereignty. 
One aspect was explained as “comprising the power of a State to exercise supreme authority over 
all persons and things within its territory.”18 This form of sovereignty is ‘territorial sovereignty’ 
(emphasis in original). The other was explained by him “[a]s comprising the power of a State to 
exercise supreme authority over its citizens at home and abroad.”19 In this context, ‘sovereignty 
is personal supremacy.’20 
Thus, legal positivists theorize sovereignty as absolute power of a State over its 
territory.  For the positivists, the State was supreme: “there was no authority superior to the 
sovereign state”21 and the sovereign state “was only bound by rules to which it had consented” 
and had the “unfettered and ultimate prerogative of waging war.”’22 From the perspective of the 
positivist legal theorists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a State’s internal 
sovereignty was separate from its external sovereignty and what a State does in its internal 
domain was not the business of anybody else. Thus, sovereignty resided in the State as an  
 
 
                                                 
12 See HLA Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958) 71:4 Harvard L Rev 593. 
13 See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Hackett Publication Co Inc, Reprint edn, 1998). 
14 As cited in Lon L Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart” (1958) 71 Harvard L Rev 
630 at 634. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law, A Treatise, (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1905) 171.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Antony Anghie, “Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate 
System of the League of Nations” (2002) 34 NYU J Int’l L & Politics 513 at 531. 
22 Ibid. 
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abstraction of legal space and geography and therefore only States as sovereigns were the 
subjects of international law, which was itself a creation of sovereign states.23 
B. SOVEREIGNTY AS THE POWER AND AUTHORITY OF THE PEOPLE 
By contrast to the “state power and authority-centered” theories of sovereignty, some thinkers, 
especially those influenced by theocratic or ecclesiastical thought, approached sovereignty from 
the premise of God’s sovereignty understood in relational terms with his created universe, and 
particularly the relationship between God and human beings and how this in turn conditions the 
relationship between human beings themselves. This approach can be said to be a “people-and-
God-centered” approach to theorizing sovereignty. One of the leading proponents of people-and-
God-centered sovereignty was thirteen century theologian and philosopher, St. Thomas Aquinas.  
St. Thomas Aquinas’ theory about sovereignty may be gleaned from his accounts of 
good government and the basis of political power and authority, and how power and authority 
reaches the people24; his accounts of the just war25, liberty and equality, law.26 From these 
disparate works, St Thomas Aquinas espouses a number of theories whose cumulative effect 
amount to what Wilfrid Parson describes as popular sovereignty.27 In the first place, Aquinas 
theorized that “Dominion and authority are institutions of human law,” and that while 
government and the system of governance are man-made but the authority of the ruler over the 
people derives from God.28 This aspect of St Thomas Aquinas theorizing later influenced works 
by legal positivist scholars who reformulated the theory in secular language: law, its validity and 
institutions are a product of social facts devoid of moral imperatives and the idea of God as the 
source of authority became an aberration.  
In the second place, Aquinas theorizes that the community is the basis of political 
authority which comes from God and the ruler exists for the community and ‘not the other way 
round.’29 This is because the ruler derives the basis of being a ruler from the community.30 From 
this perspective, the “government of the ruler is to be ordered to the good of the subjects.”31 In 
other words, the ruler is ruler for the common good and not for his or her self-interest. Indeed, 
the bonum commune or the “common good” is a central idea in Aquinas’ theorization of 
sovereignty, governance, and authority.32 Legal positivists, by contrast, deified the ruler as the 
embodiment of sovereignty. They achieved this by discarding the idea of the existence of an 
authority invisible to the human eye, God, which is central to Aquinas’ theory.   
                                                 
23 On legal positivism generally, see Samuel Shuman, Legal Positivism: Its Scope and Limitations (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1963); Robert George, The Anatomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996); Matthew Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism: Law Without Trimmings (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999). 
24 See Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica II translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
(Benziger Brothers Edition, 1947), online: <http://ethics.sandiego.edu/Books/Texts/Aquinas/JustWar.html>. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Parson, supra note 4 at 474. 
28 Ibid at 477.  
29 Ibid at 479-80. 
30 Ibid at 480. 
31 Ibid. 
32 See James Turner Johnson, Sovereignty: Moral and Historical Perspectives (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2014) [Johnson]. 
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The centrality of the common good in Aquinas’ theorizing of sovereignty is further 
illustrated by his philosophy of law.33 According to Aquinas, law derives its force and legitimacy 
only because it is directed toward achieving the common good of society.34 From this 
perspective, he defines law as ‘“an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who 
has the care of the community, and promulgated.”35 We see aspects of Aquinas conceptualization 
of law in Austin’s “intelligent being” as the source of law. Unlike Austin, Aquinas contrasted 
laws for the common good and laws, as Parson puts it, “which are laid upon a people by a ruler, 
not for the common good but for his own personal interests.”36 Such laws, Aquinas rightly 
considers them as ‘“acts of violence rather than laws.”’37 And echoing Aristotle, Aquinas argues 
that a government that promotes the common good ‘must be a government of laws, not men’ and 
‘the Prince is not legibus solutus’, i.e., above the law; he ‘must obey his own laws, even though 
there be no one above him to coerce him into this.’38 By contrast, positivist such as Austin and 
his disciples reject this view of law which implies that the law is only law if it achieves the 
‘common good’. To the positivists, this is nothing more than attempting to vest the validity of 
law in moral imperatives. Law is law regardless of its negative impact on those it affects. 
Similarly, in this positivist view, the sovereign and sovereignty are social realities of power 
relations, with the most powerful at the top of the pyramid of social relations and ‘common 
good’ or fairness all but wishful thinking. 
Thus, St Thomas Aquinas’s theory about sovereignty simply stated is that ‘it is the 
community which is sovereign, the king its subject.’39 This is because according to him, 
authority is inherent in the community and this authority is God’s authority and the king, as he 
put it, is God’s ‘“ordained minister”’.40 Sovereignty lay in the people and it entails a 
responsibility on the ruler to protect their common good. In this context, it may be argued that St 
Thomas Aquinas theorized sovereignty as responsibility of the ruler to protect its subjects. 
Aquinas’ theory of sovereignty as responsibility to protect may be further gleaned from his work 
on the just war. According to James T. Johnson, St Thomas Aquinas understood sovereignty as 
“government of a political community by a person or persons with final responsibility for the 
well-ordered justice and peace of that community41.” In other words, sovereignty is not just 
power qua power but the responsibility of temporal sovereign for the “bonum commune” or the 
“common good”. It is only in the defense of the commonwealth that the State or the sovereign is 





                                                 
33 Parson, supra note 4 at 480. 
34 Ibid at 480. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid at 481. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid at 488. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Johnson, supra note 32.  
42 Ibid. 
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Seventeen century Dutch jurist and political philosopher, Hugo Grotius also theorized 
that sovereignty resided in the people. To him, the king’s power comes from the State, and the 
power of the State comes from the collective agreement of the people who constitute it.43  
Grotius’ ideas and theorizing about sovereignty were informed by both his religious 
belief in God and the practical realities of his time: he had to defend the capture of a Portuguese 
merchant ship by a Dutch East India Company (V.O.C) fleet in the Far East, “the area around 
modern-day Singapore.”44The key legal and conceptual question that Grotius had to address was 
whether a private entity such as the V.O.C could legitimately employ force against another 
private entity, the Portuguese merchant vessel, that was obstructing its actions at sea.45 In other 
words, “who had the competence to lawfully use force,”46 the Spanish monarch who had 
sovereignty over the territories it controlled or the individuals who live in these territories? 
 Grotius resolved the question with a radically innovative and derivative idea, that 
power lay with the people and therefore the capture of the Portuguese merchant ship with 
millions of guilders worth of cargo by a private group of individuals was legitimate and an 
exercise, so to speak, of sovereignty. The people, as sources of sovereignty, had freedom to do 
what they deem right and proper. From this perspective, Grotius understood sovereignty as 
freedom for both the individual and the sovereign.47 
C. SOVEREIGNTY AS EQUALITY 
“Sovereignty” and “sovereign equality” are not synonyms; indeed, sovereign equality is made up 
of two separate words, “sovereignty” and “equality”, as “generally recognized characteristics of 
States as subjects of international law.”48  Sovereign equality is one of the key principles of 
international law that is incorporated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, which 
stipulates that the United Nations ‘shall be based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its 
members’.  
The idea that membership of the United Nations is premised on sovereign equality 
suggests that the equality of States flows from the fact of their being sovereign. But sovereignty 
as understood in international law is focused on the powers and authority of the State and 
sovereign equality in this context would mean States have equal power and authority. In practice, 
however, States vary in their possession of power – economic, political, and military power. Sir 
Robert Jennings acknowledges the existing asymmetrical power relationships between States: 
“This equality is not equality of power, territory or economy: states are, by their nature, 
unequal as regards their territorial, financial, military, and other characteristics. Rather, 
this equality is as members of the international community whatever the differences 
between states.’49 
                                                 
43 Jennings, supra note 9 at 28. 
44 Jon Miller, “Hugo Grotius” in Edward Zalta, ed, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online: 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/grotius/>. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Jennings, supra note 9 at 28. 
47 Ibid at 29. 
48 Hans Kelsen, “The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International Organization” (1944) 
53:2 Yale J L 207 at 208.  
49 Sir Robert Jennings, “Opinion Regarding the Exclusion of Israel from the United Nations Regional Group 
System” (November 1999) at 19 as cited in Alan Baker, “The Violation of Israel’s Right to Sovereign Equality in 
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But Jennings goes on to offer a typical juridical sense of sovereign equality: 
“…sovereign equality refers to the legal equality of states, as opposed to the political 
equality, and is often described as ‘juridical equality,’ i.e., equality before the law; in the 
case of states, international law.’50 
Sovereign equality as legal equality of States is what Canada and Nigeria probably had in mind 
when they agreed in a 2012 MOU to premise their engagement on sovereign equality and related 
principles stipulated in the Charter of the UN. This is based on the legal positivist vision of 
sovereignty as the power and authority of the State, albeit subject to international law. Sovereign 
equality may also be theorized in relation to a theory of sovereignty premised on the authority of 
the people as explained this article. Sovereign equality is an element of sovereignty. If 
sovereignty is a status of being and marker of identity of a particular polity, what are its inherent 
elements? I would suggest that a first fundamental element of sovereignty is its constancy and 
indivisibility. While social, economic, and political factors may change, the sovereignty of a 
people or community does not. From this flows the second element – equal rights.  
Possession of sovereignty entails possession of equal rights for all States regardless of 
other factors such as size of territory, economy, military might, etc. Equality calls for respect of 
each State and this includes respects for its rights to choose its friends, choose its development 
path, and its culture. Third, sovereignty entails independence and autonomy. True, we live in a 
world that is allegedly interdependent, today than never before, but interdependence properly 
understood does not undermine the independence and autonomy of a State or a people. And 
crucially, sovereignty entails obligations as well. The rights of a State or a people or individuals 
are counterbalanced with the obligations owing to others, in particular, the recognition and 
respect of the inherent dignity of the other, abstaining from acts or omissions that may cause 
harm to the other or violate their dignity. 
D. SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY 
(i) From Absolute to Limited Sovereignty 
Interwar jurists of the twentieth century theorized sovereignty in the light of the ravages of 
World War I and were confronted with the problem of “how to devise a system that somehow 
effectively limited state sovereignty as understood in international law even while recognizing 
that the sovereign state was the major, if not the only, actor in international law.”51 The interwar 
jurists (unlike the positivist jurists of old who deified sovereignty of the State and divorced law 
from the social, political and asymmetrical power relations, and economic milieu in which States 
engaged in the production of international law), focused on deconstructing “absolute and 
uncontrolled sovereign State”52 by espousing ideas of sovereignty that connected the internal 
sovereignty of the State to external sovereignty, and placed limits on the powers of the sovereign 
state. Indeed, some scholars such as Sir Robert Jennings have suggested that during the tenure of 
the League of Nations, international lawyers of the time thought that the “idea of sovereignty  
                                                                                                                     
the United Nations” in Alan Baker, ed, Israel’s Rights as a Nation-State in International Diplomacy (Jerusalem: 
Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 2011) 147 at 148, online: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=137137>. [Jennings 
Opinion]. 
50 Ibid at 148.  
51 Anghie, supra note 21 at 532. 
52 Jennings Opinion, supra note 49. 
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was an obstacle to the development of international law” and that what was needed above all was 
what was called a “surrender of sovereignty.”53 
Butler, a leading inter-war international lawyer, developed a concept of sovereignty in 
relation to fundamental rights. He submitted that “in defining sovereignty we should be prepared 
to reconsider the connection which is now usually held to exist between sovereignty and 
fundamental rights”54 and that “we should be prepared to find in the pre-existence of lawful 
rights reason for the existence of sovereignty; to postulate certain fundamental ethical rights, to 
define them as rights attaching to the individual.”55 And crucially, we should “conceive 
sovereignty as existing to preserve, increase, and minister to these rights in a particular manner, 
and to regard it as a meaningless phrase if these conditions are not satisfied.”56 For Butler, a 
State was sovereign only if it protects, promotes, and respects the rights of individuals. 
Sovereignty is a hollow concept if it is not directly connected with a State’s obligation and rights 
to promote and protect the rights of its citizens. Butler provides an early vision of sovereignty as 
responsibility to protect the rights of citizens. Viewed in this context, the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)’s much vouched “responsibility to 
protect or so-called “R2P” doctrine is nothing new, but is a reformulation of ideas that were 
already posited by twentieth century inter-war legal scholars. 
Hans Kelsen, one such interwar legal theorist, theorized sovereignty as “the legal 
authority of the states under the authority of international law.”57 The legal authority of States is 
not absolute even if it is often referred to as “supreme” authority.’58 He goes on further to explain 
that, “a state’s legal authority may be said to be supreme” insofar as it is not subjected to the 
legal authority of any other state; and the state is then sovereign when it is subjected only to 
international law, not to the national law of any other state.’59 
(ii) From Limited Sovereignty to the Age of Responsibility to Protect 
While inter-war international lawyers sought to place certain modicum limits on the sovereignty 
of the State, what Sir Robert Jennings described as “surrender of sovereignty,” their late 
twentieth century counterparts sought not merely a surrender of sovereignty but a rather radical 
reconceptualization of sovereignty to allegedly account for “new realities” brought about by so-
called processes of globalization. Two broad projects of reconceptualizing sovereignty during 
this period may be identified. The first project is that championed by individual international law 
and political science scholars who premise their case for a new way to conceptualize sovereignty 
on what they consider as the reality of a globalized world, where economic interdependence is 
the determinant of survival for both individuals and States. For this group of international law 
and political science scholars, globalization has whittled the eminent character of state 
sovereignty as understood so much so that it is an anachronism to speak of sovereignty, 
                                                 
53 Jennings, supra note 9 at 29. 
54 Geoffrey Butler, “Sovereignty and the League of Nations” (1920) 1 British Yearbook of Int’l L 35 at 37 [Butler]. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Kelsen, supra note 48 at 208. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid.  
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especially with respect to a State’s internal domain.60 Indeed, while some of them talk of the 
“new sovereignty,” others believe that the notion of sovereignty may already be a myth.61 
 The second project on reconceptualizing and theorizing sovereignty was initiated by the 
quintet of the Brookings Institutions62, and later taken over by the United Nations, whose 
working theory is that sovereignty means the responsibility of a State to protect (often 
abbreviated as R2P) its citizens and its failure to do just that gives the so-called international 
community the right to intervene and protect civilians in its territory whose lives are in 
substantial danger.  
(iii) The birth of a new norm or a reinvention of the wheel?  
By the end of the twentieth century, we witnessed yet another macabre performance of the 
human species: that of unbridled brutality and violence to its own. From Rwanda, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Darfur, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone to Srebrenica, 
Chechnya, Kosovo groups and communities tried to outdo each other in deliberately and 
purposefully eliminating the other, in part or in whole by mass killings and inflicting on the other 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction. This is despite the 
criminalization of these acts by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide.63 And to this macabre situation, add the oppressive poverty and arresting inequality 
between individuals, between communities, and between States, in the light of unprecedented 
wealth of a few individuals and States. 
In the face of these systemic human tragedies, States responded in ways that raised 
fundamental questions about the central organizing idea of the international system, the idea of 
the sovereignty of States, which in part posits that no State or States can intervene in the internal 
domain of another. The critical question became, “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to 
gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity?”64 
One way around this conundrum is to reconcile the competing goals of intervention and 
fidelity to state sovereignty, although that is easier said than done. As Kofi Annan starkly put it:  
We confront a real dilemma. Few would disagree that both the defense of humanity and 
the defense of sovereignty are principles that must be supported. Alas, that does not tell 
us which principle should prevail when they are in conflict.65 
The former Secretary General was not shy to suggest which of these two principles should 
prevail in case of tension between the two. According to him: 
“Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty and not 
susceptible to easy answers. But surely, no legal principle – not even sovereignty – can 
ever shield crimes against humanity. Where such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to  
                                                 
60 See Abraham Chaye & Antonia H Chaye, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory 
Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Ann-Marie Slaughter, “Sovereignty and Power in a 
Networked World Order” (2004) 40 Stanford J Int’l L 283. 
61 See Elihu Lauterpacht, “Sovereignty – Myth or Reality” (1997) 73 Int’l Affairs 137. 
62 See Francis Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1996). 
63 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 at 280 
(entered into force 12 January 1951).   
64 Kofi A Annan, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (New York: Department of 
Public Information, the United Nations, 2000) at 48. 
65 Ibid. 
S   
  
  




halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf of 
the international community. The fact that we cannot protect people everywhere is no 
reason for doing nothing when we can. Armed intervention should always remain the 
option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder it is an option that cannot be 
relinquished”66 (Emphasis supplied). 
The general consensus emerging from the late 1990s and post-Annan’s millennium report 
amongst liberal and neoliberal intellectuals and activists appears to be that the problems of 
egregious violations of human rights as seen at the close of the twentieth century in Africa, 
Europe, Asia, and Latin America could have been avoided but for the sovereignty of States 
which barred intervention. Intervention in countries that have imploded and engulfed in war, as 
the examples in Africa from Rwanda to Darfur demonstrated, was seen as the only means to 
secure the rights of victims of war.  
(iv) R2P and the Brookings Institution 
The pioneering work of the Brookings Institution’s quintet of Francis M Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, 
Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and William Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: 
Conflict Management in Africa published in 1996 attempted to make the case for intervention. 
For this to happen, they theorized sovereignty as responsibility to protect all the people in 
situations of conflict. In this framing of sovereignty as R2P, they proposed not only a “balancing 
between national sovereignty and the need for international action to provide protection and 
assistance to victims of internal conflict,”67 but also “reaffirming the responsibility of 
sovereignty and accountability to the domestic and external constituencies as interconnected 
principles of the international order.’68 
Therefore, for a State’s claim to its sovereignty to “be legitimate, sovereignty must 
demonstrate responsibility, which means at the very least ensuring a certain level of protection 
for providing the basic needs of the people.” 69 Butler made this point more than a quarter of a 
century before Deng et al that sovereignty is “a meaningless phrase” if it did not “preserve, 
increase and minister to these rights,” which he described as “fundamental ethical rights.”70  
Deng et al, further theorized that it may not be enough to simply say that sovereignty 
implies responsibility to protect. The existence of a higher authority capable of holding the 
sovereign accountable is an integral aspect of transforming the nature of sovereignty as 
responsibility to protect.71 The higher authority they envisaged is the United Nations. Again, here 
Butler saw the League of Nations as capable of possessing “authoritative sovereignty,” the 
equivalent of the higher authority proposed by Deng et al. 
(v) R2P and the ICISS 
The United Nations and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS), an initiative of the Canadian government, built on the work of Francis Deng et al. The 
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67 Deng, supra note 62 at 27. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid at 32. 
70 See Butler, supra note 54 at 37. 
71 Ibid. 
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ICISS issued its report, Responsibility to Protect in 2011.72 For ICISS, the responsibility to 
protect is a new approach to addressing allegedly new problems in changed circumstances and 
for the future. This approach proceeds from the realization that “millions of human beings 
remain at the mercy of civil wars, insurgencies, state repression, and state collapse,”73 and the 
dilemma of how to deliver “practical protection for ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because 
their States are unwilling or unable to protect them.” And crucially, experience was seen by them 
as the best teacher: 
“The experience and aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo, as well as 
interventions and non-interventions in a number of other places, have provided a clear 
indication that the tools, devices and thinking of international relations need now to be 
comprehensively reassessed, in order to meet the foreseeable needs of the 21st century.” 
 
For ICISS, and as was the case for Deng et al, the starting point was to dissect the concepts of 
sovereignty and intervention as understood and derive new language and meaning capable of 
accommodating an interventionist policy in the face of the mass murder of civilians. The ICISS 
chose to move away from the languages that framed the past debates, namely humanitarian 
intervention and the right to intervene. For humanitarian intervention, it chose “to refer either to 
‘intervention,’ or as appropriate ‘military intervention,’ for human protection purposes.”74 And 
for the right to intervene it preferred the language of “the responsibility to protect”75 (Emphasis 
supplied). ICISS was overly aware that, “changing the language of the debate, while it removes a 
barrier to effective action, does not, of course, change the substantive issues which have to be 
addressed.” 76  
Having justified the necessity for a new language for framing the issues, the ICISS then 
proceeds to offer a theorization of sovereignty that leads it to addressing the substantive issues 
and articulating their final product, the responsibility to protect. A new meaning of sovereignty 
from its classical pedigree that is deeply entrenched in the Charter of the United Nation and State 
practice, as a legal identity in international law that entitled the State to equal standing in relation 
to other States, called for a re-evaluation of the nature of obligations under that very Charter that 
deified sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention in the internal domain of the State by other 
States.77 The ICISS theorized that under the organizing principle of the United Nations system, 
membership in the Organization was “the final symbol of independent sovereign statehood and 
thus the seal of acceptance into the community of nations.”78  
But while membership into the Organization is voluntary, it comes with responsibilities. 
In the first place, “in granting membership of the UN, the international community welcomes the 
signatory states as a responsible member of the community of nations.” In the second place, the 
member State “in signing the Charter, accepts the responsibility of membership flowing from the 
signature” and in doing so, “there is no transfer or dilution of state sovereignty.” And crucially, 
while there is no transfer or dilution of sovereignty, “there is a necessary re-characterization  
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involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions 
and external duties”79 (Emphasis in original). 
What, then, are the specific contents of the re-conceptualization of sovereignty as 
responsibility? Three fundamental responsibilities are identified and explained. The first is the 
responsibility of the State “for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and 
promotion of their welfare.”80 The second responsibility is “to the citizens internally and to the 
international community through the UN.”81 And the third responsibility is for the State to be 
“accountable for their actions of commission and omission.”82 Thus, responsibility is owed both 
to the citizens and the international community under the umbrella of the UN. These three 
elements of responsibility were addressed by Deng, et al, as discussed above. The difference 
between the ICISS and the Brookings Institution quintet is that ICISS was a larger enterprise 
involving eminent former politicians and diplomats and possibly with vast resources at its 
disposal and conversing far more perspectives from various interest groups than the Brookings 
Institution’s quintet. But the end product is the same: sovereignty should be reconceptualized as 
the responsibility to protect. 
(vi) R2P: Old wine in new wineskins or new wine in old wineskins? 
Without attempting to down play the significance of the contribution of these eminent people and 
scholars, what is really new about reconceptualizing sovereignty as responsibility, or as the 
responsibility to protect? And is the responsibility to protect really a new norm just discovered at 
the close of the millennium? Was there no idea of responsibility to protect in many African 
communities ravaged by war and destruction? 
The recent theorizations of sovereignty as responsibility to protect by its leading 
proponents share one thing in common: the attempt to remove sovereignty from its abstraction in 
positivist meticulous legalism and infusing it with real life issues in sociology, politics, and 
economics, aspects hitherto considered non-legal within the positivist legal paradigm. In so 
doing, sovereignty is now being presented as a status that defines a community of people, and 
from this perspective, sovereignty actually resides in the people and implies the duty of those in 
charge to protect the citizenry.  
This new rendition of sovereignty in ways that attempt to place emphasis on the people 
as the primary basis of authority and governance, I would argue, is not a new idea at all. In the 
preceding sections of this article it was shown that as early as the thirteenth century, St Thomas 
Aquinas theorized, albeit from a theological platform, that the community is the sovereign and 
the king is the subject. In other words, sovereignty resides in the people and the leaders are 
actually given the authority to govern not for their selfish interests but for the common good,83 
and should they fail that responsibility, the people had a right to overturn tables on their bad 
leaders. Similarly, seventeenth century Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius conceptualized sovereignty in 
                                                 
79 Ibid at paras 2.14, 13. 
80 Ibid at paras 2.15, 13. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid at paras 2.15, 13. 
83 See Parson, supra note 4 at 488. 
 SOVEREIGNTY AND CANADIAN-NIGERIAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
relation to the people and implied that sovereignty resided in the people who have rights and 
freedoms. And during the inter-war period, a context no less ominous than the late twentieth 
century, Sir Geoffrey Butler, attempted to frame sovereignty as responsibility to protect rights 
and believed that the League of Nations should be “the higher authority,” in the same way that 
later proponents such as Deng et al and the ICISS submitted that the UN (and its Security 
Council in particular) should be the high authority to oversee responsible sovereignty.  
And as recent as 1949, the concept of responsibility to protect was invoked by the 
United Nations as the justification for its bid to construct a new institutional arrangement that 
would provide international protection to refugees.84 While it was not, at the time, framed in a 
language that drew an explicit interconnection between sovereignty and responsibility, it was 
nonetheless an implicit idea that the UN as an organization of sovereign member States, and 
implicitly its members, has responsibility to protect refugees, whose countries of origin had 
failed in their primary responsibility to protect them. 
Thus, in searching for solutions to similar problems, each successive generation has 
attempted to cast its problems and challenges as unique or unprecedented or modern and only 
sought historical antecedents to justify that perspective. As the words of the Biblical Book of 
Ecclesiastes, emphasize, “there is nothing new under the sun.”85  There might be new ways of 
doing the same things done before but it is important to make clear distinctions as to what is an 
innovation and what is fundamentally a new idea. This would allow for a better understanding 
why the ideas did not work in the past and what lessons can be learnt from the past to inform 
current decisions. 
This attempt to cast problems as unique or unprecedented is understandable given the 
inherent biases in each generation’s world view. In some instances, there are deliberate attempts 
to skew or distort historical accounts to legitimate current interests. Hudson, for example, 
suggests that the attempt to secularize sovereignty in the anglophone literature, especially in the 
medieval era is possibly borne by an anti-religion predisposition.86 Indeed, the neoliberal 
rendition of Bodin, Hobbes, Grotius, etc., is to secularize their views even when it is clear that 
many of these jurists and philosophers theorized and philosophized many aspects, including 
sovereignty from strongly religious inclinations.87  
This has two important implications. First, one set of ideas and ideals have been 
presented as the ultimate truth and as universal, while the others have been distorted and 
despised. The deification of sovereignty and the State by classical positivist public international 
lawyers in ways that placed the rulers on an unquestionable pedestal, with dire consequences (as 
exemplified by two bloody European wars) is a case in point. Secondly, while purporting to be 
objective, western visions of the world have been and continue to be imposed on, for example, 
African realities, dismissing everything African as uncivilized or as undermining human rights. 
Yet, in many African communities there exist a coherent set of systems and institutions that 
distribute responsibility to every member and that provide protection for various groups such as 
women, children, and elders. There are mechanisms for conflict resolution, both within a given  
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community and conflict between two or more communities. In many African communities, 
sovereignty truly resided in the people. 
(vii) Problematizing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
In addition to the problems of re-inventing the wheel, there are two main problems with the way 
the concept of responsibility to protect has been conceptualized and marketed. First, the rendition 
of the problems in Rwanda, Srebrenica, Somalia, Darfur, Kosovo, etc., as being entirely internal 
problems with internal causes. Nowhere in the background material can one find any objective 
discussions of the subtle subtexts of the structural continuities and discontinuities of international 
politics and how these influence the internal dynamics of statehood, especially in Africa, where 
naked colonial power has metamorphosed into subtle but dispersed new sites of power such as 
the Bretton Woods institutions88, with equal capacity to control and dominate the people of 
Africa, promote capital flight, and increase unemployment.89   
Therefore, any theory of the responsibility to protect that does not attempt to address the 
role of external actors in contributing to creating the conditions that eventually lead to an 
implosion and armed conflict, of whatever description, in affected States is flawed. In the context 
of Africa, for example, where former colonial powers and other powerful states, inter-
governmental organizations (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), and 
the UN itself, all-too-often dictate policies that drive inequality, promote capital flight from 
many African countries, and perpetuate western dominance through ideological colonialism, any 
theory of responsibility to protect must address the responsibility of these actors as well. Sadly, 
this is not the case. The analyses are steeped towards characterizing and framing a caricature of 
the problems in these countries as innate in the very nature of the people in these countries, with 
the outsider, the western intervenor as the solution.90 The ICISS, for example, had this to say 
when setting the background to its theorizing of sovereignty as responsibility to protect:  
“The UN is an organization dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and 
security on the basis of protecting the territorial integrity, political independence and 
national sovereignty of its member states. But the overwhelming majority of today’s 
armed conflicts are internal, not inter-state”91 (Emphasis supplied). 
The idea that the overwhelming majority of today’s armed conflicts are internal, i.e., not State 
versus another State, is fundamentally misleading and typifies the internalist thesis referred to 
already and betrays either a deliberate effort at falsifying the truth about the causes of these 
conflicts or an inadvertent ignorance of the dynamics of international politics.   
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While the cases of Cote D’Ivoire and Libya are illustrative here, the discussion will only 
focus on the former. In discussions about whether to apply the principle of the responsibility to 
protect in the Cote d’Ivoire, the role of France in the chaos in the country hardly featured 
anywhere. The outbreak of civil war in Cote D’Ivoire in 2002 is generally seen by outsiders as an 
internal conflict caused by historically embedded inequalities between the different regions of the 
country and bad governance.92 And while the internalist thesis may hold true to some extent, the 
reality, however, is that the conflict in the Cote D’Ivoire, as is the case for all these former 
colonies of western imperial powers in Africa, is partly the creation of its former colonial power, 
France, which is implicated in the conflict that eventually engulfed Cote D’Ivoire. France, albeit 
through its companies, has continued to control the economies of its “former” colonies in Africa, 
since most of the leaders of these countries signed pacts of ‘friendship” with France and allowed 
French control through the back door. The leaders of former colonies that try to seek true 
independence for their countries by giving control of the economy to its citizens have run the risk 
of antagonizing French interests and being deposed from power.93 A classic example is the case 
of the late Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso. Thomas Sankara took power in a coup in 1984 with 
his erstwhile friend Blaise Compaore94, and attempted to cut dependence on France for almost 
everything, including food. He also tried to lay an industrial base in which Burkinabes would be 
really in charge of their own country.95 But in so doing, Thomas Sankara rubbed the French 
interests the wrong way and the French eventually got rid of him using his friend Blaise 
Compaore, with the complicity of the late Cote d’Ivorien President Felix Houphouet-Boigny.96 
For the uncritical eye, however, the coup in Burkina Faso in 1987 that led to the assassination of 
Thomas Sankara was sold as an internal conflict or problem. 
Similarly, under the late octogenarian President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, France 
through political, security, economic, and cultural ties maintained a tight control on Cote 
D’Ivoire; French citizens owned companies and business in key sectors of the economy and thus 
in reality controlled the economy of Cote d’Ivoire. 97 But when President Laurent Gbagbo came 
to power, in partly contested election results in 2000, his plans to reform the economy by 
reducing French influence and fighting corruption in the economy, brought him problems with 
the French who, despite their apparent posture as peace brokers during the crisis, hatched the  
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plan to get rid of him by sponsoring the rebellion in the northern part of the country.98 Gary 
Busch, for example, sees the crisis of Ivory Coast as rooted in the continued dominance of that 
country by France:  
“The reasons for the continuance of French dominance of the Ivory Coast are easy to see. 
The root cause of this situation is the French Francafrique policy towards Africa; its neo-
colonial activities which have blighted Ivory Coast democracy for decades. The French 
never actually gave up owning and controlling Ivory Coast even after it had achieved 
‘flag independence’; having a flag, a national anthem, a seat in the UN and a football 
team.  
Thus, while in theory Ivory Coast was an independent African State, in practice it was tethered in 
every aspect of life, including economic life, to its colonial master France. Again, according to 
Gary Busch: 
“The Pacte Coloniale, which had tethered the economy, trade, finance and military 
structures to France was carried out in every Ivorian ministry, the bank and institution by 
the hundreds of French nationals sent to the Ivory Coast as ‘advisors’ under the French 
Ministry of Co-operation. In some ministries there was one Frenchman for every Ivorian. 
Ivorian sovereignty was demeaned by the presence of the French ‘co-operants’ who made 
many actual decisions in running the country…The French business community 
dominates almost every aspect of the national economy, even the oil industry and cocoa 
industry where it shares its presence with a limited number of foreign companies…It was 
only the government of the FPI, led by President Gbagbo, who tried to loosen the French 
reins on the country…”99 (emphasis supplied) 
This invidious and systemic interference by France in the Cote d’Ivoire is not considered in the 
underlying assumptions of R2P. The UN intervention in Ivory Coast led by France under the 
cloak of R2P masked the real causes of the conflict and especially the dynamics of asymmetries 
of power relations between Cote d’Ivoire and its colonial master, France, and the vested interests 
of the latter in the Cote d’Ivoire. The UN, the liberal and the neoliberal worlds were taken in by 
the characterization of the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire as an internal conflict for which the Gbagbo 
government was wholly held responsible. Sometimes references were made to the rebels but only 
in a more perfunctory manner. Yet, the real culprit in the whole tragedy of Cote d’Ivoire, France, 
is never going to be held accountable for the gross violations of human rights which occurred in 
that country as a result of conflict that it planned, funded, and executed with the rebel outfit it 
created under the leadership of Alassane Ouattara, considered more sympathetic to French 
interests in Cote d’Ivoire and who has now handed control of Ivory Coast back to France (just as 
Blaise Compaoré handed over control of Burkina Faso to France).100  
While the idea of R2P is not invidious per se, its underlying assumptions fail to 
explicitly capture the role of external interests as part of a wider set of factors causing conflict, 
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especially by powerful former colonial powers (such as France) in Africa, and international inter-
governmental organizations (including the United Nations and its agencies). Yet, any valid 
theory of R2P must proceed from the premise that sovereignty resides in the people of a given 
country and they through their leaders have the exclusive right to determine their interests. In 
addition, a theory of R2P must integrate both internal and external factors and interests and 
allocate responsibility for the resulting suffering of civilians to all involved, whether powerful 
states or others.101 
E. CONCLUSION 
Sovereignty is a complex concept that does not lend itself to precise theorizing. It is constructed 
upon contingent interests in time and space. The dominant theory of sovereignty is that 
postulated by nineteenth and twentieth century legal positivists who deified the Westphalian 
State and clothed it with absolutist and juristic authority and power. This served European 
powers well (they conquered territories far and wide and shared them amongst themselves), but 
still could not avoid two bloody and destructive European wars in the twentieth century.  
There is a return to the medieval antecedents of theorizing sovereignty in relation to the 
people and not abstractly in relation to the State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all people 
are equal in dignity. It is the people who are sovereign and the State as a community of people is 
an instrumentality of enacting that sovereignty both at the domestic and international level. In 
this sense, sovereignty entails equality amongst peoples and States; it also entails both rights and 
obligations for States to serve their people and protect the common good. From this perspective, 
sovereignty is not synonymous with ability but with the dignity and rights and duties of peoples. 
 
III. THE NATURE OF CANADIAN-NIGERIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ENGAGEMENTS: 
 
If sovereignty is the dignity and authority of the people and entails equality amongst peoples and 
States, how might one characterize the engagements between Canada and Nigeria as “equal” 
sovereigns in the area of human rights during the period under review? It might be helpful to 
approach this in two ways: first, by assessing their engagements in the political, economic, and 
social realms and second, through assessing their human rights engagements specifically.  
A. ENGAGEMENTS IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL SPHERES 
At the political level, the relation between Nigeria and Canada has been described by some 
Nigerians as ‘cordial’102 resulting from “years of mutual respect, cooperation and historical 
association to the Commonwealth.”103 In the view of these commentators, Nigeria and Canada 
“have always enjoyed excellent relations.”104 Canada is seen as “a great friend of Nigeria”105 and  
                                                 
101 See Alexandra dos Reis Stephanopoulos & George A Lopez, “From Coercive to Protective Tools: The Evolution 
of Targeted Sanctions” in Monica Serrano & Thomas Weiss, eds, The International Politics of Human Rights: 
Rallying to the R2P Cause? (New York: Routledge, 2014) 48 at 56-58. 
102 For example, see the weighty intervention of His Excellency, Ambassador Olufemi Oyewale George, High 
Commissioner, High Commission of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Canada, while appearing before the 
Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Study on Africa, 23 February 2005, in Canada, Proceedings 
of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Study on Africa (Ottawa: Public Works and 
Government Service Canada, 2005) 33 [Proceedings].  
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid at 8:33. 
105 Ibid at 8:34. 
S   
  
  




both countries are said to have “always been friends and have always depended on each other in 
so many issues.”106  
According to the Canadian High Commission in Nigeria, “Canada enjoys strong and 
increasing bilateral relations with Nigeria, which is one of two strategic partners for Canada in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.”107 Canada and Nigeria “share values such as multi-culturalism” and “have 
federal system of governance and are members of the Commonwealth.”108 
The relations did suffer some set back, however, when the Sani Abacha military junta 
was in power and particularly after its blatant execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other 
Ogoni activists in November 1995.  Thus from 1995-1998, Canada broke off diplomatic ties with 
Nigeria.109 Full diplomatic relations were restored after the restoration of democratic rule in May 
1999.110 Canada played a significant role in mobilizing and sustaining international support and 
pressure to restore democratic rule in Nigeria. The extent, if any, to which Nigeria has influenced 
political outcomes in Canada remains, at best, unknown. 
Engagements between Canada and Nigeria in the economic sphere, according to some 
Nigerians, have not been as good as it has been in the political sphere. The “excellent” political 
engagements have yet to be “translated into greater dividends in the economic sphere.”111 
According to some assessments in 2005, for example, overall “bilateral trade is low in volume 
and variety” and Canadian investment in the Nigerian economy is dismally small.112  
There have been some improvements since 2005, however. In 2013, past the period 
under review, the volume of trade between the two countries was said to be “rapidly growing” 
and the private sector in both countries was seen to be playing a “strong role” in “expanding the 
two countries economic ties.”113 The Canadian High Commission in Nigeria indicated that 
“Nigeria is Canada’s largest bilateral merchandise trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
trade between Nigeria and Canada has increased more than threefold since 2007…”114 Moreover, 
as at today, “[t]he Canadian business presence in Nigeria is substantial and multi-faceted”115 and 
“Canadian interests cover a full range of key sectors, including oil and gas, telecommunications, 
and manufacturing equipment, aeronautics, energy, and engineering education services.”116  
Canadian-Nigerian relations in the social realm, from the perspective of some 
Nigerians, have also lacked the exuberance experienced in the political field. A major concern 
raised by one informant, a former Nigerian High Commissioner to Canada, is a lack of 
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reciprocity.  Appearing before Canada’s Senate’s Standing Senate Committee on Foreign 
Affairs’ Study on Africa in 2005, he told the Committee that “[a]t the social level, Nigerians are 
experiencing considerable obstacles in obtaining Canadian entry visas. Regrettably, my mission’s 
prompt issuance of visas to Canadians is not being reciprocated.”117 (emphasis supplied). He 
reiterated his misgivings with the way Canada treated Nigerian applicants for entry visas in 
interviews conducted for this project and pointed out that one of the main problems in the 
Canada-Nigeria engagement is “the way they treated our nationals”118  
By contrast, Canadian officials seem not to see the same social problems in the 
relationship as the Nigerians. The Canadian High Commission in Nigeria states that Canada and 
Nigeria enjoy increasing bilateral relations and one reason is that Canada and Nigeria share 
“people-to-people ties which provide a solid foundation for increased engagement.” 119 
A related issue to the refusal of entry visas to Nigerians is the expulsion of Nigerians 
who entered Canada illegally. Nigeria was disappointed that Canada, whom they considered a 
friend, could simply deport their citizens without considering the implications or even at least 
informing the Nigerian Foreign Affairs Ministry.120 As a friend, letting the Nigerians know of the 
impeding deportation of the citizens would have allowed some form of engagement between the 
two countries on the best possible way to address the issue.121 
B. ENGAGEMENTS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD 
The focus here is on the nature of the human rights engagements between Canada and Nigeria 
and the main driver or drivers of this relationship. Other aspects that could also be examined 
include the attainments, if any, of these human rights engagements, the problems, and impact of 
trade on these engagements, and what human rights issues each country has pushed in each 
other’s domain.  
(i) The Nature of the Engagements 
The nature of Canada-Nigeria engagements in the field of human rights is not as clear as one 
would like it to be. Informants interviewed for the research project on which this volume is based 
had different perspectives about the nature of the engagement.  One informant, for example, 
described the engagements as “good”; another said it was “solid”122; and yet another said it was 
“very healthy; both countries get along very well”123; and at least four informants said they 
“don’t know” the nature of the engagements. 
 While from the perspective of those Nigerian NGOs that are recipients of Canadian 
funding, whether through Canadian private foundations or government agencies such as CIDA, 
the engagements between Canada and Nigeria in the field of human rights is solid, other NGOs 
and individuals see the two countries as pursuing competing visions of human rights, especially 
on a government-to-government level. One informant stated that “Canada sees human rights 
from their own angle alone. They do not see the Nigerian angle to human rights.”124 The same  
                                                 
117 See supra note 102 at 8:32. 
118 Interviewed on 25 June 2014, Abuja, Nigeria. 
119 See supra note 107. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Interviewed on 5 June 2014, Ajah, Lagos State, Nigeria [Interview 5 June 2014]. 
123 Interviewed on June 2014, Abuja, Nigeria [Interview June 2014]. 
124 Interviewed on 25 June 2014, Abuja, Nigeria. 
S   
  
  




informant stated that on “a government-to-government basis, we will always have clashes 
because they wouldn’t see issues the way we are seeing it.”125  
 It may therefore appear that at a governmental level, Canadian-Nigerian human rights 
engagements are characterized, in part, by clashes, tensions, and biases. In other words, to many 
actors/commentators, Canada’s idea about human rights and Nigeria’s idea of human rights are 
informed by two different worldviews of human rights. When High Commissioner Olufemi 
Oyewale George appeared before the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Study on 
Africa on 23 February 2005, for example, he made no explicit reference to human rights. Instead, 
his presentation focused on the broad level of political, economic, and social issues.126 By 
contrast, and as pointed already, respondents working with NGOs that were recipients of 
Canadian funding, saw the human rights relationship between Canada and Nigeria in glowingly 
positive terms – it is ‘solid’127 or ‘very healthy’.128 
 That there is bound to be tension between Canada and Nigeria in the realm of human 
rights should not be surprising to anyone familiar with the foreign policy objectives that each 
country pursues. Canada’s foreign policy is informed by among other things, a belief that 
“Canadians expect their government to be a leader in the human rights field by reflecting and 
promoting Canadian values on the international stage.”129 The idea that Canada’s citizens expect 
their government to promote Canadian values at the international stage as human rights raises the 
question whether Canadian values are universal and synonymous with human rights. Indeed, 
others might ask what right do Canadians have to think that their values must be projected and 
imposed on others? What happens to those who do not share some Canadian values? It raises the 
old spectre of the “civilized” versus “uncivilized” people dichotomization, with the “civilized” 
arrogating to themselves the power to “civilize” the “uncivilized.”  
Nigeria’s foreign policy, by contrast, is driven by a radically different set of principles: 
fighting for African unity and independence, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-alignment and 
non-intentional interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and regional economic 
cooperation and development.130 Thus, Nigeria’s foreign policy does not aim to project Nigerian 
values as human rights on the international stage but to pursue cooperation in diverse areas of 
human endeavor in order to create peaceful and stable communities, both in Africa and other 
parts of the world. 
(ii)The Drivers of the Relationship 
With diametrically opposing world views about human rights, who then drives the human rights 
agenda in the engagements between the two countries in this field? At least four informants 
indicated that Canada is the main driver of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements. 
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Indeed, one informant clearly stated that the “main driver is Canada. Nigeria is being driven.” 
Some informants observed that the Canadian government uses its State agencies such as the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the High Commission of Canada in 
Nigeria to push for human right issues in Nigeria. Other informants pointed out that Canadian 
NGOs, such as the Canadian Local Fund Initiative (CLFI), the Canadian Human Rights Trust 
(CHRT), are active on the ground providing funding to Nigerian NGOs pursuing human right 
issues of importance to Canada and Canadians. Informants identified the right to health, and 
women’s and children’s right to health in particular, as being one of the main areas of human 
rights that Canada is pushing for through CIDA in Nigeria. 
 If Canada is the dominant driver of human rights in these engagements, what influence, if 
any, has Nigeria had on the internal or domestic dynamics of human rights issues in Canada? 
Only one informant indicated that “Nigeria hasn’t pushed for any human rights issues in 
Canada”, observing that instead “Canada has pushed human rights issues in Nigeria.” The 
majority of the informants suggested that Canada is the dominant of the two in pushing for 
human rights in Nigeria’s territory. It may be argued that Nigeria’s inability to influence human 
rights issues in Canada is consistent with its foreign policy of generally not interfering in the 
internal domain of other countries, and therefore should not be a surprise to anyone. One might 
contend that Nigeria, while more populous than Canada and with vast resources, is still a Third 
World country, poorly managed on the balance, and poor; and that it thus has little to offer to 
Canada.  
C. CONCLUSION 
While both Nigeria and Canada officially assert that bilateral relations between them are 
“excellent” or “strong”, none of two tends to talk explicitly about the nature of their engagements 
in the area of human rights. It is not clear whether the strength of the bilateral relations extends 
to their engagements in the field of human rights.  
The evidence suggests Canada and its NGOs are the main drivers of human rights issues 
in the broader spectrum of bilateral relations between these two countries. Canada in particular 
does this through a number of ways, such as support through CIDA for Nigeria’s health system, 
albeit with a focus on women and child health issues. 
 It would appear that any issues about the nature of the cooperation between the two 
countries in the field of human rights are buried in diplomatic speak and will require a more 
critical discourse analysis to fathom these. 
 
IV. SOME THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE CANADIAN-NIGERIAN 
HUMAN RIGHTS ENGAGEMENTS: 
What theoretical insights might be drawn from the discussion above on the broad character of 
Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements? This question is tackled in the following sub-
sections.   
A. SOVEREIGNTY AS DIGNITY AND THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE  
The evidence demonstrates that Canada is the more dominant partner in its human rights 
relationship with Nigeria given its greater economic power, and thus its ability to fund NGOs  
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and the like, provide technical support to governmental ministries and so on, and influence 
human rights related events and activities in Nigeria. Nigeria, on the other hand, has been shown 
or known not to have pushed for human rights issues in Canada, even though there are serious 
human rights issues in Canada to pick from, such as the issue of the rights of the indigenous 
peoples and the squalid conditions in which some of them live. This may be largely due to its 
weak economic position and standing in comparison to Canada and its foreign policy posture of 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other country. Thus, there is an element of 
asymmetrical power relation here. The question, then, is what are the implications of this 
asymmetry of power relations between the two for theorizing sovereignty? Can Canada and 
Nigeria be said to possess equal sovereignty in the light of the vast material inequalities between 
them? 
To reflect on a theory of sovereignty that incorporates the material differences between 
Canada and Nigeria and States in general, I revisit the idea of the people as the basis of 
sovereignty as theorized by Aquinas and others, and as was discussed earlier. A people-centered 
premise allows one to focus on the status of being rather than the ability to possess physical 
power and material wealth in order to frame the content of sovereignty. This approach sharply 
contrasts with the dominant positivist and liberal version, which focuses on the State and power 
to inscribe what sovereignty is. From the dominant positivist formulation, sovereignty meant the 
power and authority of the European State to have exclusive domain within its spaces as well as 
a right to access and control territories it considered terra nullius, i.e., ‘nobody’s land’, thereby 
opening the door for colonialism, imperialism, and domination of non-European peoples.131 
Implicit in the theorizing of sovereignty from the western positivist frame is the association of 
sovereignty with capability or ability or civilization. 
 From a people-centered premise, however, sovereignty may be theorized as an inherent 
identity and dignity of a given community of people, occupying a defined territory anywhere on 
planet earth, with a distinct culture – their language, art, science, technology, religion, mores, 
traditions, and beliefs systems.132 The social, economic, and political organization of that 
community need not be identical to that of any other community, however advanced and 
sophisticated this other community may regard itself. Thus, sovereignty is a distinctive marker of 
a collective being that transcends racial bigotry and possession of military and economic 
competence and capacity. Sovereignty as an inherent and distinctive marker of the being of a 
community is a constant as dignity is to human beings, who collectively form a community of 
people. From this perspective, sovereignty may be theorized as dignity.133 In other words, a 
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given community of people has dignity, regardless of whether they are considered a State in the 
sense of western Westphalian model, or whether they are poor. It is sufficient for the community 
to regard themselves, in their own right, as a distinct community or a nation. In this context, 
communities that others would consider uncivilized are a sovereign people as much as the 
English, Canadians, Americans, or Nigerians. 
 Thus, the sovereignty of the contemporary State as a community of peoples is the total 
sum of the dignity of its entire people; it is not the unquestionable authority and power of some 
abstract entity, above which there is no other. Just as the fact of being and having dignity as a 
human being is the basis upon which the inherent rights and obligations of the individual flow, 
so is sovereignty of the people. It is the basis from which a group or community derives its right 
to self-determination and statehood and the State and the people become inseparable for without 
the people there can be no State. Sovereignty, seen from this perspective, reconceptualizes the 
State not merely as an abstract juridical entity, but rather as an organic community of people.   
 This approach to theorizing sovereignty rejects the notion of sovereignty as the power 
and capacity of an abstract State, because a State is a State not because it has capacity – military, 
economic, and technological – but because it is a community of people made up of individuals 
each of whom possess dignity and power and authority derive from them. This proposition does 
not necessarily discount the importance of power and capacity of whatever color but simply 
clarifies the often blurred distinction between the state of being and the consequences of 
possessing or not possessing something, such as power and capacity. The contention being that 
the state of being is not a priori dependent on possession of capacity or power because the 
capacity to do things or to make things happen and the inherent fact of being are two distinct 
phenomena. The inability of a person to do certain things or to do the wrong things does not in 
any way undermine the fact of their being a being and in possession of an identity, and dignity.  
 This is because several factors may determine questions of power and capacity, some of 
which may be intrinsic to the person or entity but others may be the result of external factors. For 
instance, Nigeria is a colonial creation, its people having been dominated by British colonial rule 
for decades and a great deal of its current predicaments must be traced to external factors, quite 
apart from the more well discussed internal factors. Or, does a poor person and a rich person 
have dignity on the basis of their status as a poor or rich or because both are human beings? The 
rich man has greater economic capacity but may lack the capacity to love and tolerate others. Are 
both imbued with equal dignity? Capacity may be acquired; it is not inherent in the nature of 
being but dignity is inherently woven into the nature of being. Similarly, is State A with a gross 
national product (GNP) of, say, $3 billion imbued with equal sovereignty with State B which has 
a greater GNP of $3 trillion?  Or framing this in people terms is Community A with a wealth of 
$3bn without sovereignty while Community B with a wealth of $3 trillion imbued with 
sovereignty? With a $3 trillion worth, Community B may be said to have more economic 
capacity. But the $3 trillion GNP may be controlled by a very minute percentage of the entire 
population with the majority impoverished.  
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Theorizing sovereignty in this way allows us to place the vast material inequalities 
between Canada and Nigeria in context: they are not constitutive of sovereignty. The sovereignty 
and equality of both States is derived from the dignity of their respective peoples, not the 
economic material wealth that each has amassed. Therefore, sovereignty may also be theorized 
as a bundle of rights and obligations and not abilities or capabilities.  
 A people-centered approach to theorizing sovereignty further allows one to overcome the 
implicit racial biases in dominant western Liberal theories of the State and of sovereignty that 
deny the sovereignty of African peoples and of indigenous communities in the Americas and 
Australia. Because these communities lacked the military capabilities of the colonial rulers, they 
were deemed not to possess dignity and rights. In other words, they were seen as not sovereign, 
even though before the despicable advent of colonialism they had established distinct functioning 
communities with varying levels of sophistication.134 Despite their various levels of 
sophistication, these people were viewed by all-too-many Europeans (whether scholars, priests, 
or politicians) as inferior, uncivilized, and barbarous, and as therefore not deserving of equal 
treatment as human beings capable of the possession of dignity and sovereignty. And while 
colonialism has in theory ended in Africa and Africans now live in distinct States created by the 
colonial enterprise, the denigration of Africa’s peoples as inferior and as lacking in sovereignty 
continues even today by some western intellectuals and jurists alike, some even going as far as 
calling for the recolonization of Africa.135  
 And crucially, institutions such as the International Court of Justice that is supposed to be 
the beacon of international justice continues to perpetrate the idea that African communities 
lacked sovereignty and were merely identifiable areas of territory. The Court had this to say in 
the Cameroon v Nigeria (with Equatorial Guinea intervening) case in response to Nigeria’s 
contention that the Chief and Kings of Old Calabar had sovereignty over their territories vis-à-vis 
the 1884 agreement with Great Britain: 
In the view of the Court many factors point to the 1884 Treaty signed with the Kings and 
Chiefs of Old Calabar as not establishing an international protectorate. It was one of a 
multitude in a region where the local Rulers were not regarded as States. Indeed, apart 
from the parallel declarations of various lesser Chiefs agreeing to be bound by the 1884 
Treaty, there is not even convincing evidence of a central federal power. There appears in 
Old Calabar rather to have been individual townships, headed by Chiefs, who regarded 
themselves as owing a general allegiance to more important Kings and Chiefs. Further, 
from the outset Britain regarded itself as administering the territories comprised in the 
1884 Treaty, and not just protecting them. Consul Johnston reported in 1888 that "the 
country between the boundary of Lagos and the German boundary of Cameroons" was 
"administered by Her Majesty's Consular Officers, under various Orders in Council". The 
fact that a delegation was sent to London by the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar in 1913 
to discuss matters of land tenure cannot be considered as implying international 
personality. It simply confirms the British administration by indirect rule.136  
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The Court thus adopts the legal positivist view of sovereignty which inheres in an abstract 
powerful State and roundly rejects any suggestions that the conquered peoples of Old Calabar 
possessed sovereignty.  
 Therefore, the vast material inequality between Canada and Nigeria does not imply that 
Nigerians have lesser sovereignty in comparison to Canadians. If Canada proceeds to fund 
programs in Nigeria consistent with Canada’s interests and values but which may be opposed by 
Nigeria because they contradict Nigeria’s values, Canada will be undermining Nigerian 
sovereignty because it will be intruding in the internal affairs of Nigeria based on its economic 
might. It might, however, be argued that if Nigeria opposes such Canadian funding activities that 
are not consistent with Nigerian values, then Nigeria will be expressing its sovereignty. Such an 
argument, while persuasive, conflates two different things: expression of sovereignty and 
undermining sovereignty by another are not one and the same thing.  
 
B. SELF-INTEREST IN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIPS 
In their bilateral or multilateral relations states often claim to be pursuing shared interests and 
goals. The Canadian-Nigerian relationship has not been an exception. In fact, in their MoU of 
2012 Canada and Nigeria appear to premise their relations on sovereign equality and respect and 
a framework for “constructing lasting strategic partnership between the two federal, multicultural 
democracies.”137  The praxis, however, points to other, often unarticulated reasons in the 
agreement for cooperation: the innate national self-interests of each State. In this context, the 
realists and their neo-realist cousins (despite some damaging criticisms, especially from the 
Constructivist school of IR) still have a point when they theorize that nothing less than the 
national interests of States is the key driver for States’ accumulation of power and drive to form 
strategic partnerships. 138 
Indeed, one informant stated that Canada’s human rights drive in Nigeria through CIDA 
and NGOs should not be delinked from its national, especially economic, interests, noting that:  
“[W]hile Canada contributes to human rights projects in Nigeria through CIDA for the 
NGOs as well as supports government parastatals, they do this to benefit their own 
economy so that they can gain good trade networks and better import/export 
relationships.” 
Another informant argued that Canada’s contribution to democracy and the right to health in 
Nigeria “earns Canada some favor in the eyes of Nigeria because of the aid they give us.” 
While the engagements between Canada and Nigeria are not explicitly driven by realist 
theoretical imperatives, it is evident that each country is at least pursuing certain national 
interests from the relationship. At least Canada’s interests in Nigeria are known. Canadian 
interests cover ‘key sectors, including oil and gas’ resources, sell its technology and invest in a 
booming telecommunications sector, market its manufacturing equipment, exploit opportunities 
in aeronautics, energy, engineering, education, mining technology, and transportation.139  
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Investing abroad may be less costly, especially with weak labor laws in Nigeria (and Africa in 
general) and this might help energize its economy and provide opportunities for its citizens both 
at home and abroad.  
Similarly, Nigeria’s interests in the relationship are easily discernible. It hopes to tap 
into Canadian expertise and investment in infrastructure development especially at the state and 
federal level, attract Canadian investments in agriculture, information and communication 
technology, whose cumulative impact, it hopes, will spur its own economic growth and expand 
the opportunities available for its own citizens. And there is more to these economic interests. A 
relationship with a strategic partner such as Canada comes at a time when Nigeria is working 
hard to shed its past image, an image awash with military generals turning tables on each other 
and violating human rights with abandon, including being suspended from the Commonwealth at 
the peak of one of its worst experiences at bad governance under General Sani Abacha who 
executed a number of Nigerian human rights activists, including renowned environmentalist and 
Ogoni-cause flag bearer, Ken Saro-Wiwa.  
With the advent of civilian rule in 1999 under General Olusegun Obasanjo and later two 
successful changes of its national leadership through the ballot rather than the barrel of the gun, 
Nigeria’s image of notoriety for disregard for the rule of law, democracy, and observance of 
human rights had considerably improved by the time of the signing of the MOU in 2012.  The 
successful election of 2015 where former President Jonathan Goodluck conceded defeat to 
General Buhari has raised the hopes and aspirations of Nigerians that something good is 
eventually in sight. However, the precarious nature of Nigeria’s apparent democratization 
process, and its execution of the war on terror, (especially its war against the radical Islamist 
outfit, Boko Haram), raise concerns that Nigeria is not yet totally out of the woods. In this 
context, continued cooperation with a State of stature such as Canada that has over the years 
constructed for itself an image of a moral actor on the international plane,140 is critical in 
projecting a new of image of being accepted into the community of democratic States. 
 
C. CONSTRUCTION OF A DISTINCT IMAGE 
Both Canada and Nigeria appear to be keen on constructing an image that projects their value 
systems, although Nigeria is possibly less successful in achieving this as it has had very limited, 
if any, influence on domestic Canadian politics. And while their values may be at variance in 
certain respects, especially in the context of human rights, the two countries have since 
establishing diplomatic relations in 1960, identified with the Commonwealth, federalism, and 
multiculturalism as sites where certain of their interests converge or may converge.141 Indeed, in 
a joint communique issued after the inaugural meeting of the Nigeria-Canada Binational 
Commission (BNC), an entity established by a memorandum of understanding in 2012, the two 
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countries pledged that “the BNC will be the basis for constructing a lasting strategic partnership 
between the two federal, multicultural democracies.”142  
Canada has always projected the image of a generous, liberal, and democratic country 
that pursues a multilateralist and cooperative relationship with other countries.143 In other words, 
it cares about the interests of other countries and its relationship with others seeks to enhance 
those interests while not dominating the country at issue. Canada portrays itself as a country that 
exerts positive influences, especially in the promotion and protection of human rights and the 
support of democratization processes in countries considered less democratic. Canada, for 
example, provided support to the 1999 elections that launched Nigeria’s most recent drive to 
democracy and this support must be seen in the context of Canada’s unflinching stand against the 
military junta of late Nigerian president General Sani Abacha, under whose regime egregious 
violations of human rights occurred. Moreover, Canada was amongst the first Western countries 
to re-establish diplomatic relations with Nigeria immediately after General Abdusalami 
Abubakar came to power in 1998 and promised to usher in fundamental changes that would lead 
Nigeria on the path to democracy. Canada started bilateral negotiations with the new rulers in 
Nigeria with a view of supporting political reforms.144 Consequent Canadian-Nigerian 
engagements in the area of democratic governance saw Canada provide support for Nigeria’s 
2003 and 2007 elections, a trend that continued even up to the 2015 elections.145 
Nigeria has also projected the image of the “big brother” on the African continent, with 
a foreign policy that sought to play a key role in the liberation struggles of many African 
communities yet under the yoke of colonialism and other forms of imperial dominance in Africa, 
including the fight to abolish apartheid in South Africa. In addition, Nigeria played a leading role 
in the creation, funding, and development of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), a fifteen-member community, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its 
transformation into the African Union (AU), and the establishment of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD). ECOWAS is possibly the only African organization with some 
clout as demonstrated by its role in the search for solutions to the armed conflicts that ravaged 
impoverish countries in the region such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, and Mali.146 Also, Nigeria plays an instrumental role in international peace 
support operations and is “the second largest troop contributing African nation and the fifth 
largest globally.”147  
Thus, it may be theorized from the character of the Canadian-Nigerian encounters in the 
human rights field, and the underlying context, that States seek to enhance their image by 
ascribing to a vision of themselves as a community of people of equal dignity and hence equal  
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sovereignty. Approaching their inter-state engagements in this way reduces suspicions and 
enhances the opportunity for identifying mutual or complementary interests. 
 
D. THE SOCIALIZATION OF THE “OTHER” INTO ONE’S VALUE SYSTEM 
Some States seek to socialize others into their value systems and aim to capitalize on cooperative 
relationships to achieve this, instead of using blatant force and threats. The Canadian-Nigerian 
engagements in the human rights field typify this aspect. In comparative terms, and as noted 
already, Canada has a much bigger economy and a competitive edge in many areas, from 
manufacturing, transportation, agriculture to telecommunications technology. These are aspects 
in which the Nigerian economy does not, at present, possess a competitive position but is making 
progress toward achieving. In this context, Canada can bring to bear on Nigeria this vast source 
of leverage in ways that ensure that Canadian values become embedded in every aspect of 
Canadian assistance to Nigeria. The evidence suggests that a number of Nigerian NGOs funded 
through Canada’s CIDA and private foundations have embraced Canadian values without 
question. One informant whose organization has benefitted from Canadian funding spoke in 
glowing terms of the nature of the relationship between Canada and Nigerian in the area of 
human rights. According to this informant: 
“I think the cooperation between Canada and Nigeria on human rights is solid. For us 
at… in December 2013 through January this year we got funding from the CLFI 
(Canadian Local Fund Initiative) for our meetings. The funding also covered the payment 
of our staff time in all the ancillary payments for the meeting to happen. Also, the 
Canadian Human Rights Trust paid for the screening of a movie we created titled “The 
Veil of Silence”, which also aired in Canada. We have very good partnership, but it is 
through the CLFI and the Human Rights Trust.” 
States with economic and military power are more likely to be minded tying aid to their 
poorer counterparts to the promotion of values that they espouse. Aid thus can be used as a 
means of softening attitudes and persuading aid recipients to receive and accept the aid giver’s 
worldview as the right worldview. Canada has not spared the opportunity to do that in its 
relations with Nigeria. Following their second meeting under the auspices of the Bi-National 
Commission in January 2013, for example, Canada offered to help Nigeria surmount its security 
challenges posed by the terrorist group, Boko Haram but only “within a framework that respects 
human rights and the rule of law.”148   
 
E. VALUES CAN BE SACRIFICED  
Economic interests always seem to trump human rights values. This is regardless of the public 
rhetoric about linking aid with human rights. One informant noted that “[h]uman rights hinders 
trade if the understanding is not parallel,”149 that is if human rights and trade are not understood 
as both beneficial and “trade affects every country’s relationship” with others.150 Indeed, another 
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said that ‘the wire of politics connects human rights with trade and even government regimes as 
they change.’151 
But given the low of volume of trade between Canada and Nigeria during the period 
under review, it is not possible to assess how Canada would have behaved in its crusade to 
promote human rights in Nigeria if Canadian multinational corporations played a key role in the 
Nigerian economy, especially the natural resources economy. Private corporations are the 
conduits through which a state’s economic interests in another state can be realized and most of 
these companies wield enormous powers and possess vast resources. Their influence on policy 
and human rights is often huge. They are a dominant group with capacity to lobby political 
power brokers. They also have access to the highest echelons of power within the state and all-
too-often influence economic policies that promote their own interest and those of the 
shareholders.  
Cases of multinationals operating in countries with known poor human rights record and 
violating the rights of local people, such as polluting their water sources, environmental 
degradation, land expropriation, and lower wages are well documented.152 Yet these companies’ 
home country governments or States rarely intervened and instead sought ways to strengthen 
protection of their country’s companies.153  
Canada, under the former Harper government, provides a classic example. While 
Canada prides itself as promoting human rights and Canadian values, the case of Canadian 
mining companies in countries such as Tanzania, Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone demonstrate 
that economic interest all-too-often trumps others values, including human rights. When rich 
Canadian mining companies, for example, face local opposition in these countries and the 
developing world generally because of their destructive policies and activities, the Canadian 
government sides with them and relentlessly pressures the governments of these poor countries 
to protect these companies.154 
Canada intervened in Tanzania, for example, on behalf of Canadian gold mining giant’s 
subsidiary in Africa, African Barrick Gold, which has a huge mining portfolio in Tanzania, and 
lobbied the Government of Tanzania and Tanzanian Parliament to reject the recommendations of 
the Presidential Mining Sector Review Committee.155 The recommendations were contained in a 
report by the Committee, whose mandate was to amongst other things, scrutinize the mining  
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sector and review mining contracts.156  Some of the Committee’s key recommendations included, 
amending the various tax laws to cover loopholes exploited by mining multinational companies, 
granting fewer tax exemptions for mining companies, taking a number of measures to expand the 
government role and stake in commercial mining companies, and instituting a timely and fair 
compensation for communities affected by mining projects.157 The Committee’s reports comes 
after an earlier report commissioned by an association of religious groups in Tanzania, published 
in March 2008, investigated the extent to which Tanzania was benefitting from its gold 
resources. 158 The report identified three serious problems with Tanzania’s gold mining industry: 
first, it ‘provides the government with miniscule tax revenue’; second, it is ‘subject to minimal 
governmental and democratic scrutiny’; and third, ‘people in the gold mining area are not 
benefitting and many are being made poorer.’159 And crucially, between 2002 and 2005, 
‘Tanzania exported gold worth more than US$2.5bn’160 but only ‘received an average of 
US$21.7m a year in royalties and taxes on these exports.’161 Moreover, the report points that a 
conservative estimate of ‘the combined loss to Tanzania of a low royalty rate, unpaid corporate 
tax, and tax evasion is at least US$400m over the past seven years.162 Before the advent of large-
scale gold mining in Tanzania, between 500,000 to 1.5 million Tanzanians depended on small-
scale mining to earn a living in the 1990s but by 2006, when the floodgates to large-scale mining 
were opened, an estimated 400,000 Tanzanians were without jobs.163 
Pressure for reforms in the mining sector to protect both local communities around the 
mines and workers in the mines and improved revenues for the government mounted, especially 
in the Parliament, following the release of the Commission’s findings, and the findings the report 
commissioned by the religious groups in Tanzania.164 The Canadian government, as noted 
already, intervened on behalf of African Barrick Gold, which owns half of the mining 
concessions in Tanzania, and lobbied through the Canadian High Commission in Tanzania with 
Tanzanian legislators to block the reforms.165 While there is a lack of evidence showing whether 
Canada succeeded in lobbying relevant actors to block the mining sector reforms, it is possible 
that it delayed urgently needed reforms because Tanzania enacted a new mining law in 2010166, 
two years from the released of Presidential Mining Sector Review Committee’s report. Crucially, 
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Canada pressed Tanzania for stronger investor protection in trade with Tanzania with the sole 
aim of a fast-tracked negotiation of a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement 
(FIPA).167  One member of the Tanzanian Parliament, Honorable Zitto Kabwe, asked the then 
Prime Minister, Mizengo Pindu, whether the fast-tracking of FIPA talks was meant to block the 
Presidential Mining Sector Review Committee from being released in July 2008.168 
According to Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
“Canada’s objective in entering these negotiations is to secure comprehensive, high quality 
agreement to protect investors through establishment of a framework of legal binding rights and 
obligations.”169 On 16 May 2013, Canada and Tanzania concluded an agreement ‘for the 
promotion and reciprocal protection of investments.’170 The agreement avoided the standard 
nomenclature that Canada has been using with other countries, such as Nigeria, the Foreign 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA). This may be because of the negative 
reaction to Canada’s aggressive pursuit of a FIPA with Tanzania, including attempts to fast-track 
the negotiations. 
The focus of the Canada-Tanzania agreement on promotion and reciprocal protection of 
investments is really the establishment of a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes 
outside Tanzania’s legal system.171 This renders any reforms in the mining sector nugatory 
because regardless of the reforms, they will often run counter to the investment contracts which 
will easily trigger the dispute settlement mechanism. In this sense, Canada’s lobbying to subvert 
the mining sector reforms that would have seen better returns for both ordinary Tanzanians and 
the improve revenue collection for the government are successful. Investor-State Dispute 
settlement mechanisms often privilege the multinational corporation over and above the citizens 
of the host country. Concerns about the harm and damage done by some of these investors, such 
as the mining companies, to the environment and the communities (especially the forced eviction 
of small scale miners and small holding farmers) receive perfunctory treatment.   
V. CONCLUSION: 
First, Sovereignty means a bundle of rights and obligations of a people; it resides in the people as 
the source of authority and power. All peoples around the world are sovereign, in their own right, 
regardless of their capabilities or abilities. States are abstract and geographic representations of a 
people and derive their existence and functions because of the people. 
Second, States, regardless of the image they portray, seek to maximize their egoistic 
interests. Some will use military and economic power; others will use ideas such as equality and 
cooperation or both power and ideas. Some States, especially middle powers like Canada, 
however, will seek to advance their interests in strategic partnerships that emphasize ideas, such 
as equality and respect and seek complementarity instead of taking advantage of existing  
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asymmetries of power, social, and economic relationships that exist between it and prospective 
partners.  In this context, however, ideas simply become the means to an end. 
Third, States worry about their image and seek cooperation as a means to enhance and 
project that image. Both Canada and Nigeria sought through their relationship to project the 
image of democratic and multicultural functioning and successful federal States. In addition, 
both States sought to project themselves as champions of human rights (albeit often differently 
defined) and sought a multilateralist and cooperative approach to resolving conflict and ensuring 
security for their citizens and those in other conflict-affected parts of the world. 
Fourth, States, regardless of their professed commitment to certain values such as 
human rights, will all-too-often privilege economic interests above all other values. In other 
words, where there is tension between the goal of realizing economic interests and the goal of 
promoting human rights, economic interests will almost always prevail. 
Finally, ideas, whether as theories, principles, institutions, or doctrines are not value-
free; they are shaped by given socio-economic contexts and biases.  
 
 
